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Abstract 
This article is written in response to Kanwisher’s Progressions article “The Quest for the 
FFA and Where It Led” (Kanwisher, 2017). I reflect on the extensive research program 
dedicated to the study of how and why perceptual expertise explains the many ways that 
faces are special, a research program that both predates and follows Kanwisher’s 1997 
landmark article where the fusiform face area (FFA) is named. The expertise accounts 
suggests that the FFA is an area recruited by expertise individuating objects that are 
perceptually similar because they share a configuration of parts. While Kanwisher (2017) 
discussed the expertise account only very briefly and only to dismiss it, there is strong 
and replicable evidence that responses in the FFA are highly sensitive to experience with 
non-face objects. I point out that Kanwisher was well positioned to present these findings 
in their historical context as she participated in the design of the first fMRI study on car 
and bird expertise, as well as the first replication of this finding. Perhaps most relevant to 
readers interested in the neural bases of face processing, it is important to distinguish 
studies that describe the phenomenon of face-selectivity from those that test an 
explanation for this phenomenon. Kanwisher’s claim of a face-dedicated processing 
module that is not the result of our experience with faces is made without attention to a 
great deal of expertise research which is directly inconsistent with that claim. The claim 
also lacks more direct support, as face-selective responses in the visual system are not 
found in infants and children and face-selective activity in FFA does not appear to be 
heritable. 
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In 1997, at Yale, I was preparing to defend my dissertation, entitled “Dissecting face 
recognition: The role of expertise and level of categorization in object recognition”. Four 
years earlier, I had told my advisor, Mike Tarr, that I wished to learn cognitive 
neuroscience, then a new and exciting field. I wanted to do brain imaging, study brain-
damaged patients and learn all about object recognition so that we might understand how 
results from these various approaches applied to face recognition. In my memory, and I 
wish I had it on tape, Mike said “well, I don’t really do cognitive neuroscience, but we’ll 
learn it together”. By the time I was writing up my thesis, Mike had more than delivered 
on his promise and we had several wonderful collaborators (Jim Tanaka, Marlene 
Behrmann, John Gore and Adam Anderson) with whom we started to explore the 
hypothesis that the acquisition of perceptual expertise, or more specifically the skills we 
develop in a lifetime of individuating faces, might underlie the specialization of face 
recognition. While completing my dissertation, I decided to reach out to the person 
whose own research most clearly ran contrary to my conclusions, Nancy Kanwisher at 
MIT, to ask whether I could do my postdoctoral research with her. Up to now, I have let 
the results of this collaboration speak for themselves, but here for the first time I offer 
some reflections on this experience and what unfolded since. 
In a recent Progressions article in The Journal, Kanwisher reflected on the impact of a 
study she published about the same time that I was completing my dissertation. 
Kanwisher’s work, conducted with Josh McDermott and Marvin Chun, used fMRI to 
localize the fusiform face area (FFA) and characterize its responses. Published in 1997, 
the paper reporting this research has been highly influential in our field (Kanwisher et al., 
1997). The Progressions format brings a nice personal dimension to our understanding of 
neuroscience research, but as the format has a historical flavor, it requires a high bar for 
accuracy. That is, future students of our field should expect to find in such pieces an 
accurate account of how influential research programs came to be and have been 
received. A short paragraph in that article (see Figure 1) addressed the expertise account 
1
Figure	1.	Paragraph	from	N.	Kanwisher’s	Progressions	article,	JNeurosc.	37(5),	page	1058,	with	annotations	indicating	sections	in	the	present	article.	
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of the specialization of FFA. 
Because my own story intersects with Kanwisher’s, I am in a unique position to 
contribute and add to the record and, because a great deal of my own research has been 
devoted to the study of expertise, I am also well positioned to offer a defense of the 
expertise account against Kanwisher’s dismissive conclusions. I have organized my 
perspective into 5 sections, corresponding to the specific points raised in Kanwisher’s 
single paragraph that addresses this alternative, leaving to others any evaluation regarding 
other claims present in the remainder of Kanwisher’s article. 
The origins of the expertise account of specialization for faces 
Kanwisher suggests that the discovery of the FFA was attacked by those disinclined to 
accept the strong formulation of the modularity hypothesis and this include the alternative 
account of expertise. However, this perspective does a disservice to a literature devoted 
to trying to explain the specialization of face recognition that pre-dates Kanwisher’s 
paper. The expertise account of face specialization was not motivated by the 
demonstration of an FFA (for which no behavioral data were collected), but by 
behavioral work on the face inversion effect. That is, it was well established in the face 
processing literature that faces are more difficult to recognize when turned upside down 
compared other kinds of objects (airplanes, flowers) (Yin, 1969). The Face Inversion 
Effect was taken as a signature of the special holistic processes reserved for face 
recognition. However, contrary to this view, Diamond & Carey (1986) demonstrated that 
dog show judges evince a face-inversion effect that well may be the result of their 
specific experience. Such findings along with neuropsychological research by Farah and 
colleagues (Farah et al., 1995) motivated the bulk of my dissertation research based on a 
set of 3D rendered novel objects we called Greebles. Critically, as with human faces, 
Greebles share a small number of parts in a common overall spatial arrangement so that 
individuating them requires encoding the specific shape of their parts and small deviation 
in their configuration. We trained naïve observers in the lab to individuate these 
perceptually similar objects, and as observers’ response times decreased, we found that 
they also became very sensitive to the configuration of Greeble parts (Gauthier & Tarr, 
1997), just as Jim Tanaka had observed for face stimuli (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka 
and Sengco, 1997).  
Kanwisher’s 1997 FFA article, as she acknowledges herself, followed in the footsteps of 
other work describing face-selectivity in the visual system (e.g., Sergent et al., 1992; 
Haxby et al., 1994; Puce et al., 1996). Again, in her historical account, Kanwisher 
suggests that her paper “drew fire”. Contrary to that characterization, there was already 
an extant literature discussing explanations for face specialization, with one explanation 
being that faces become special due to the kind of experience most of us have with them. 
More to the point, it seems that the empirical findings mainly pointed to a phenomenon 
that begged explanation. There was nothing in Kanwisher and colleagues’ observation of 
neural face selectivity that helps account for or tests any theory on the origins of such 
face selectivity.  
 
At the same time, it is worth acknowledging that there has been a tendency towards some 
scientific backlash whenever a researcher has proffered a singular “spot in the brain” as 
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evidence for a specialized and hard-wired mechanism. To be clear, this fallacy of 
reasoning, which was perhaps more likely when fMRI was new and shiny, is something 
that Kanwisher has been careful not to fall prey to in both her original paper and her more 
recent, historical piece. That being said, Kanwisher rejects, in the strongest possible 
terms, the expertise hypothesis as a viable alternative account of why we observe face 
specialization – as such, it is critical to be clear as to what this alternative actually says. 
 
The expertise account of the specialization of regions1 in the fusiform gyrus for faces 
does not predict that every category of expertise will activate face-selective areas. Rather, 
it holds that the experience most of us have with faces, individuating a large number of 
objects with a common configuration of parts, is what leads this area to respond more to 
faces than to most stimuli. Logically then, visual expertise that differs in critical ways 
from face processing should not recruit the same brain regions (indeed, expertise with 
letters or musical notation engages other brain areas, Baker et al., 2007; James et al., 
2005; Wong et al, 2010). This framework invites us to study how faces are processed and 
to devise scenarios where nonface objects are processed in the same manner as faces, in 
which case, they should recruit the FFA. Looking back, the expertise hypothesis has had 
significant impact, represented by the extensive body of research that has characterized 
face-like expertise with many non-face objects, typically associated with holistic 
processing and sensitivity to configural information (e.g., Boggan, Bartlett, Krawczyk, 
2012; Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005; Chua, Richler & Gauthier, 2014). Moreover, extensive 
practice individuating visually-similar objects leads to face-like processing, whereas 
extensive practice with other tasks but the same objects does not (e.g., Scott, Tanaka, 
Sheinberg & Curran, 2008; Wong, Folstein & Gauthier, 2012; Wong Palmeri & Gauthier, 
2009). 
Kanwisher’s own expertise research 
Remarkably, one of the first studies to examine the neural bases of nonface object 
processing in experts was the result of a collaboration with Kanwisher. When I was 
considering what direction to pursue for a post doc, I decided that it would be particularly 
interesting to work with someone with whom I disagreed. In science, as in politics, we 
tend to circulate among those who share our opinions. To counter this instinct, I proposed 
to Kanwisher what others later referred to as an adversarial collaboration2 (Kahneman, 
2003) – realizing that we might never agree on the interpretation, I thought it would be 
scientifically advantageous to agree on the method for the “next” study that needed to be 
done. I was bolstered by my own funding from the Natural Sciences and Engineering 
Research Council of Canada and the generous support of John Gore at Yale to scan 
volunteers as needed for the project. I approached the collaboration looking for a unique 
training experience that would hopefully establish a higher bar for this research program. 
Kanwisher agreed to collaborate with me on this study. 
																																																								1	The single FFA has since been shown to comprise two distinct functional areas in most 
brains (Pinsk et al., 2009; Weiner & Grill-Spector, 2010).	2	I	would	recommend	this	experience	to	all	scientists	at	some	point	in	their	training.	
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Over the course of several months, I visited Kanwisher at MIT so that we could settle on 
a design for our study. Relevant to this discussion was the publication of an important 
component of my PhD thesis, an fMRI study of perceptual expertise in which I had 
trained people in the lab to become visual experts with Greebles. I had found that upright 
Greebles came to engage the FFA more than upside-down Greebles or familiar objects 
(Gauthier et al., 1999). Kanwisher thought that these effects could be due to Greebles 
“looking like faces”. It was a fair point (one I later pursued and showed not to be the 
case, Gauthier, Behrmann & Tarr, 2004) and so we decided together that an appropriate 
next step would be to test the expertise hypothesis with two categories that were very 
different geometrically both from each other and from human faces, namely birds and 
cars. We also thought it important that one category was man-made and the other was 
not: any result we obtained for both categories could not be easily explained as an artifact 
of the category itself. After agreeing on an experimental design for our new fMRI study, I 
recruited about 20 bird and car experts and quantified their individual levels of expertise 
using behavioral tasks involving bird and car recognition. I then scanned 16 of these 
experts on a 1.5Tesla scanner at Yale, while Kanwisher scanned another 3 experts on a 
3Tesla scanner at MGH in Boston. We found that the FFA in each of our subjects showed 
neural responses at least twice as much to faces as to objects a clear replication of 
Kanwisher’s earlier results. Critically, this same brain region also showed a stronger 
response to cars than birds in car experts and a stronger response to birds than cars in bird 
experts. True to the term “adversarial collaboration,” Kanwisher, whose hypothesis was 
not supported by these results, searched for other plausible alternative explanations and 
requested a variety of further tests and analyses. I learned a great deal in that process, 
looking at these results from every possible angle. Perhaps the most important of these 
analyses is one that to my knowledge was entirely novel for the time, and one that we 
have replicated many times in the ensuing years (McGugin et al., 2012; 2014; submitted): 
we examined spatially unsmoothed data and co-registered the different subjects’ FFA on 
their peak of maximum face response. The most face-selective voxel in the FFA also 
coincided with the peak voxel of the expert response to cars and birds. This and other 
analyses were published in 2000 in Nature Neuroscience, but without Kanwisher as a co-
author by her own decision. She did not at the time voice any concern about the 
soundness of the design we came up with or the analyses that she requested. 
Interestingly, Kanwisher requested (and received) permission to use the same stimuli and 
tasks in future studies. Kanwisher hired a new postdoc, Yaoda Xu, and together they 
planned to replicate our study. Specifically, Kanwisher and Xu were concerned that the 
blocked design used in the first bird and car expertise study may have led to more 
attention to objects of expertise by experts, and so they adopted an event-related design in 
which they thought these effects were less likely. Summarizing the results of this 
attempted replication, the Xu paper (Xu, 2005) ends with: “…the present study reported a 
strong expertise effect in the right FFA. The results are overall consistent with those of 
Gauthier et al. (2000) and suggest the involvement of the right FFA in the processing of 
non-face expertise visual stimulus.” Kanwisher, again, declined to be an author on the 
replication study. When, in her Progressions piece, Kanwisher suggests that expertise 
effects in FFA do not replicate, it is historically significant that she designed the original 
study and the first replication attempt (both my 2000 article and Xu’s 2005 paper 
acknowledge support from her grants). In her latest article, Kanwisher describes the rush 
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she gets when replicating her own results. She speaks to the replication crisis that our 
field faces and suggests that we need a stronger tradition of replicating our own results 
before publishing them. This is certainly important, but we also need a tradition of 
publishing the results of our studies even when they do not support our predictions. 
Do expertise effects in FFA replicate?  
In addition to questioning the replicability of expertise effects, Kanwisher (2017) rejects 
this account based partly on direct criticisms: that the effect is small, that it may be due to 
attention, that the effect is distributed rather than locally-constrained to FFA and that it is 
not replicated in some studies. She also points to findings about face-selectivity that seem 
to support a face-selective account: the very sharp boundary that goes from face-selective 
responses in the FFA to non-face selective responses outside the area and the finding that 
most neurons inside face-selective patches in the monkey, thought to be analogous to 
human FFA, are highly face-selective. I now evaluate each of these claims and results, 
showing the criticisms do not hold up to scrutiny. Instead, it may be helpful to realize that 
studies reporting highly face-selective responses, just as the original report that named 
the FFA, describe a phenomenon, but they do not explain it.  
Despite evidence to the contrary, Kanwisher suggests that expertise effects are small and 
do not replicate. First, let us consider the size of expertise effects. While the selectivity 
for faces versus objects in the FFA is typically measured as a ratio (e.g., (signal for faces 
– signal for nonface objects)/signal for nonface objects), effects of expertise are measured 
as a correlation between such a ratio (e.g., (signal for cars vs. signal for non-car 
objects)/signal for non-car objects) and a behavioral index of expertise. We correlate 
neural responses with behavioral expertise because the latter can be measured on a 
continuum. We predict larger selectivity with greater expertise but it is not clear what 
level of experience with cars would be equivalent to an average level of expertise with 
faces. Correlations are measures of effect size, and in a 2014 study, to enable a power 
analysis, we performed a meta-analysis of then-published fMRI studies of expertise with 
cars (Gauthier et al., 2000, 2005; Xu, 2005; Harel et al.,  2010; McGugin et al.,  2012). 
We observed the average expertise effect to be r = 0.54, 95% CI [0.40; 0.65]. To detect 
that effect with a power of 80% at a .05 alpha level, 22 subjects are sufficient. When we 
ran the new study (McGugin et al., 2014), the maximum car expertise effect we obtained 
was also r = .54, in the right middle FFA (FFA2). It remained significant (r = .44) when 
we restricted the analysis to only face-selective voxels within a very small area (25 mm2) 
in the center of the FFA.  
Second, Kanwisher lists studies in which expertise effects were not found. It is always a 
challenge to understand null results, but these studies were not without limitations. One 
measured car expertise behaviorally with modern cars but presented antique cars in the 
scanner (Grill-Spector et al., 2004). This motivated us to run a behavioral study in which 
we found that a marker of perceptual expertise for faces, the tendency to process all parts 
of an object at once (a.k.a. holistic processing) is found in modern car experts when they 
are tested with modern cars, but not with antique cars. In other words, it is important to 
test experts with images of stimuli with which they are actually expert. The other two 
studies (Op de Beeck et al., 2006; Yue et al., 2006) are training studies with artificial 
objects and small samples of 6 and 9 subjects, respectively. Training effects of expertise 
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are likely to be smaller than those obtained in real world experts, and neither study tested 
for holistic processing as an indication that the training led to face-like processing. This is 
a test we have successfully employed in our own training studies, and we find that the 
activity in the fusiform gyrus of our trained subjects correlates with this behavioral 
marker (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Wong et al., 2009). Aside from studies with birds and 
cars, and other investigations in my lab demonstrating effects of expertise in the FFA, 
other studies have found expertise effects for non-face objects in FFA, including for 
radiological images and for chess pieces configuration (Harley et al., 2009; Bilalić et al., 
2011; 2016; Rishi, Tarr & Kingon, 2013).  
In addition to being a replicated effect with conventionally medium-to-large effect sizes, 
and observed in the peak of face-selectivity in the FFA, the expertise effect shows the 
same sharp boundary that FFA shows for face selectivity. Indeed, face-selective 
responses drop to zero within a few mm of FFA’s standard boundary (Spiridon et al., 
2006). In a study where we observed an expertise effect across 25 subjects (McGugin et 
al., 2012), we looked at the 12 subjects with FFAs extending at least 300 mm2 in 
flattened cortical space, to consider response selectivity at several concentric, non-
overlapping regions of interest. These analyses revealed that the expertise effect was 
present in a 200 mm2 area, but the correlation was no longer evident outside of this 
boundary (Figure 2). When Rankin McGugin, in her dissertation, found expertise effects 
that were highly spatially co-localized with face-selectivity in the fusiform gyrus and 
were strong even in the most face-selective high-resolution voxels in FFA, she and I 
immediately thought of the findings by Tsao 
and colleagues in the monkey (Tsao et al., 
2006). Because expertise effects are robust in 
very small highly face-selective patches, and 
if almost all the neurons in these patches are 
face-selective in the human as Tsao found in 
the monkey, then it follows that the same 
neurons should participate in the processing 
of face and non-face expertise. This suggests 
that face and non-face expertise should 
compete when they are engaged at the same 
time. Indeed, such competition has been 
observed in behavioral (McGugin et al, 2011; 
McKeeff et al., 2010) ERP (Gauthier et al., 
2003; Rossion et al., 2004; Rossion et al., 
2007) and fMRI work (McGugin et al., 2015). 
Are expertise effects in FFA attentional? 
A putative explanation of the expertise effect is that experts attend more to objects of 
expertise, and indeed attention is known to boost signals at virtually all levels of the 
visual system (e.g., Wojciulik et al. 1998; Murray and Wojciulik 2004). But it has never 
been clear to me why this is more of a concern for expertise effects than for face-
selectivity (if anything in the visual world draws our attention, it is faces), or how 
attention was supposed to explain effects that were highly co-localized with hot-spots of 
	Figure	2.	Results	adapted	from	McGugin	et	al.,	2012.			
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face selectivity. 
 
A few specific results speak directly to the question of whether expertise effects in FFA 
can be explained by attention. Harel et al. (2010) reported that effects of car expertise 
were distributed in areas outside of FFA and diminished when cars were task irrelevant. 
We followed up on this in two studies, both manipulating attention and the second 
replicating the results of the first. In both studies, we found that while expertise effects 
for cars could be found in several visual areas when the attentional demands were low, 
when we ramped up these demands using bottom-up and top-down manipulations of 
attention (e.g., when cars were task-irrelevant) expertise effects were reduced in most 
areas but remained robust in middle FFA (McGugin et al., 2014a and b). When we used 
multi-voxel pattern analysis for the first time to look at effects of expertise, we found in 
that same region patterns of activity for faces and cars that were more similar to one 
another in experts than in novices (McGugin et al., 2015b). But perhaps the effect that is 
most obviously impossible to explain by attention is the finding that the regional grey 
matter thickness of the FFA predicts the ability to recognize cars and other vehicles 
(McGugin, VanGulick & Gauthier, 2016). 
 
In her article, Kanwisher also suggests that the presence of expertise effects outside of 
FFA is incompatible with the expertise account. They are not: real-world expertise with 
cars or chess is likely to affect many different visual processes, only some of which may 
be supported by FFA. In the same vein, we process faces in many ways, and face 
selectivity is also found in many areas or patches across the brain including occipital 
regions (LOC), superior temporal gyrus, temporal pole, and even in frontal regions (e.g., 
Hoffman and Haxby, 2000; Rossion et al., 2012). 
 
Face recognition may be heritable but activation in FFA is not 
Kanwisher forcefully dismisses the idea that expertise can explain the origins of the FFA, 
although later in her Progressions article she writes that we do not know whether 
activation in regions like FFA is determined genetically or by experience. I would argue 
that the bulk of the evidence since Kanwisher’s 1997 paper suggests that activation in 
FFA is much more determined by experience than by genetic influences. Aside from the 
strong empirical evidence I reviewed here regarding expertise effects in the FFA, recent 
work by Kanwisher and her colleagues (Deen et al., 2017) failed to find any visual area in 
4-6 month-olds that is more active for faces than objects. Other work has found no stable 
FFA activity even in 5-8 years old (Golarai et al., 2015; Scherf et al., 2007).  
An important distinction between face expertise and activation in the FFA is that there is 
strong evidence that the behavioral ability to recognize faces (and also cars!) is highly 
heritable (Wilmer et al, 2010; Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015), while the activation in the 
FFA is not. The FFA profile appears to be primarily influenced by experience, even in 
studies where activation in other visual areas is found to be partly heritable (Pinel et al., 
2014). This may explain why it is often difficult to find a relation between the FFA’s 
response to faces and face recognition ability. For instance, we have found that even 
though the individual differences in neural responses are highly reliable, as are behavioral 
measures of face recognition, they may not be related, even in the same sample that show 
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an expertise effect for cars (McGugin & Gauthier, 2015). In one very large study (Huang	et	al.,	2014), this relation was found to be much smaller (r294=0.13) than the expertise 
effects around r=.5 that we typically find for non-face objects. It	would	require	362	subjects	to	expect	replicating	this	effect	with	80%	power	at	an	alpha	of	.05,	even	with	a	one-tail	test! But in recent work, we reasoned that if we manipulated the level of experience 
people have with faces of a novel race, then these faces would come to elicit a brain-
behavior correlation in FFA comparable in size to the expertise effects we see with non-
face objects. This is indeed what we found (McGugin et al., submitted). These results 
demonstrate, now with faces, the critical role of experience in determining FFA 
responses. 
There is no question that the location of the FFA, highly similar across subjects, is under 
important constraints (e.g, Hasson et al., 2003). Genetic influences on high-level visual 
recognition ability could reflect variation in connectivity among several brain areas 
critical to the acquisition of face (and non-face) recognition ability (see the compromised 
white matter tracts in individuals with congenital prosopagnosia, which is heritable, 
Thomas et al. 2009). This acquisition, driven by experience, may fine-tune and optimize 
neural representations in a number of areas, including the FFA. At least, this is the 
expertise account of the specialization observed in FFA, and I believe it is at the moment 
a highly plausible, although most certainly interim, answer to the quest that Kanwisher 
and her colleagues initiated in 1997.  
It would be helpful to fight the impulse to depict evidence of face-selectivity, which is a 
phenomenon, and the expertise account, which is an hypothesis about the origins of this 
phenomenon, as being in opposition. We would do better to conduct research that 
attempts to understand the interaction between innate influences and experience (e.g., 
Srihasam et al., 2014). And, more than anything, it is important that we keep searching 
for truth to support our theories instead of using science to support our “truth”.  
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